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 Abstract 
This paper examines the political mechanisms of welfare state policymaking in two countries 
with differing levels of institutional and political constraints, Germany and Ireland. The study 
analyzes the joint impact of political constraints and varying party governments on different 
dimensions  of  labor  market  policymaking.  It  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  left-wing 
governments must cut spending more to accommodate the conservative opposition and gain 
its support when political and institutional constraints are high. To simultaneously ensure the 
support from pivotal extra-parliamentary actors, namely labor unions that are closely linked 
to the governing party, the left has to further compensate the unions‘ prime constituency, 
which  is  the  well-integrated  core  workforce.  The  privileged  treatment  of  labor  market 
‗insiders‘ by left-wing governments in countries with high political constraints comes at the 
expenses  of  labor  market  ‗outsiders‘.  Left-wing  party  governments  in  countries  where 
political constraints are low are better able to address the needs of broader segments of 
society. 
Zusammenfassung 
Diese  Studie  analysiert  Arbeitsmarktreformen  in  Deutschland  und  Irland,  zwei  Ländern, 
welche  unterschiedliche  politische  und  institutionelle  Zwänge  aufweisen.  Untersucht  wird, 
wie sich der gemeinsame Effekt des institutionellen Gefüges und der Regierungsideologie 
auf  die  Gestaltung  der  Arbeitsmarktpolitik  auswirkt.  Die  Fallstudien  zeigen,  dass  linke 
Regierungen in Ländern mit hohen institutionellen Zwängen mehr Kosten einsparen müssen, 
um  sich  die  Unterstützung  der  Oppositionsparteien  zu  sichern.  Damit  die  Regierung  die 
Unterstützung  der  Gewerkschaften  nicht  verliert,  wird  bei  der  Gestaltung  der  Reform 
besonders  auf  die  Bedürfnisse  der  Kernarbeitnehmerschaft  Rücksicht  genommen.  Die 
bevorzugte  Behandlung  von  ‚Insidern‘  in  Ländern  mit  hohen  institutionellen  Zwängen 
geschieht  auf  Kosten  der  Arbeitnehmer,  welche  nicht  von  einflussreichen  Interessen-
organisationen  vertreten  werden  (‚Outsider‘).  In  Ländern,  wo  linke  Regierungen  bei 
Reformen nicht auf die Unterstützung der Opposition angewiesen sind, hat die Regierung 
die  Möglichkeit,  die  verbliebenen  Resourcen  auf  unterschiedliche  Segmente  der 
Arbeitnehmerschaft zu verteilen. 
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Introduction 
During  the  past  decades,  the  challenges  that  mature  welfare  states  are  facing  have 
increased  significantly. Among  these  challenges  that  party  governments  in  post-industrial 
countries are facing are high economic interdependence, fiscal austerity and the structural 
change  of  the  economy.  The  combination  of  these  developments  affects  the  room  to 
maneuver  for  political  actors  and  have  a  strong  impact  on  domestic  labor  markets.  In 
addition, globalization and related phenomena also influence how different groups in society 
are  affected  by  unemployment,  atypical  employment  and  other  societal  risks.  Inequality 
among different groups of labor market participants has increased due to globalization and 
the  aforementioned  developments.  This  article,  which  is  part  of  a  larger  project  that 
combines macro-level evidence with subsequent case studies, examines the impact of party 
governments on labor market reforms and how labor market ‗insiders‘ and ‗outsiders‘ are 
affected  by  varying  party  governments.
1  It  addresses  the  question  whether  party 
governments still have room to shape policies according to their  underlying party ideology 
and how labor market reforms are mediated by varying levels of political and institutional 
constraints.  
To  examine  how  varying  party  governments  affect  different  groups  of  labor  market 
participants, I focus on labor market reforms. Labor markets in post-industrial economies are 
particularly  vulnerable  to  the  contemporary  developments,  and  governments  in   post-
industrial democracies are under pressure to adjust social security schemes to meet the 
needs of workers in a more flexible environment. One of the characteristics of the most 
recent  wave  of globalization  is the  increasing dualization of the  labor ma rket and  the 
unequally  distributed  risk  to  lose  employment  (e.g.  Goldthorpe,  1984;  Rueda,  2006; 
Blanchard, 2006; Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). Important elements of labor markets in post -
industrial economies are an increasing percentage of part -time and fixed-term employees, 
and a bigger share of women participating in the labor market. In order to address the 
challenges related to globalization, party governments are under pressure to reform social 
security schemes and labor market institutions. When reformi ng labor market policies and 
labor market institutions, the specific aspects that party governments emphasize greatly 
differ in scope and range. 
Unlike most scholars, this larger project examines the impact of party governments on two 
dimensions  of  social  policy  reforms,  the  expenditure  dimension  and  a  redistributive 
dimension. In addition, the theoretical framework makes clear predictions how varying levels 
of  political  constraints  differently  affect  party  governments  with  different  ideological 
backgrounds.  My  argument  implies  that  both  left -wing  and  right -wing  governments  in 
                                                       
1 The quantitative study includes the following mature welfare states: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
States, United Kingdom and covers the period between 1971-2002. 2 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
countries with little institutional constraints cut social spending. However, when institutional 
constraints are high, left-wing governments must cut spending more to accommodate the 
conservative  opposition  and  gain  its  support. To  simultaneously  ensure  the  support  from 
pivotal extra-parliamentary actors, namely labor unions, the left has to further compensate 
the  unions‘  prime  constituency,  which  is  the  well-integrated  core  workforce.  The 
compensation of these ‗insiders‘ through an increase of the redistributive generosity of social 
security  schemes  by  left-wing  governments  therefore  increases  with  greater  institutional 
constraints.  This  increase  in  redistributive  generosity  beneficiary  for  the  core  workforce 
comes at the expenses of the poor and the increasing share of atypically employed people in 
post-industrial countries.  
In this paper, I examine this argument using case study research and empirically trace the 
above mentioned processes in two countries with varying political constraints, Germany and 
Ireland. The analysis of labor market reform processes in Germany and Ireland shows that 
institutional and political constraints have influenced leftist and conservative governments in 
different ways, and therefore also affected the content of the reform and the reform process 
as  such.  Each  country  study  covers  two  reform  processes  affecting  labor  market  and 
unemployment policies in the mid 1990s and early 2000. This paper thus adds to the debate 
on the role of party politics in welfare state policymaking and the reform of social policy 
schemes in industrialized Western European countries. I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 3 
1. Theoretical Argument 
It is generally accepted that party governments face high reform pressure and thus have to 
focus  on  cutting  social  expenditures  (e.g.  Green-Pedersen,  2002;  Pierson,  2001;  Ross, 
1997;  Starke,  Obinger  and  Castles,  2008).  Governments  of  both  right-  and  left-wing 
partisanship are similarly affected by these economic and fiscal constraints. While the two 
differing party governments may vary with respect to their desired amount of spending, both 
must accept that actual expenditures have to be stabilized because the economic constraints 
do  not  leave  room  for  alternative  choices  on  this  dimension.
2  This  implies  that  party 
governments converge on the expenditures dimension, but it is plausible that they still take 
different policy positions on how the remaining resources are distributed among particular 
societal groups. This would allow gover nments to compensate ‗losers‘ of retrenchment, in 
particular the so-called labor market ‗outsiders‘ or ‗working poor‘, by reforming social policies 
in a way that other, less affected groups carry a higher share of the reform.
3 
Generally, cuts in social wel fare measures affect the labor force and poor people most. 
Especially the well-organized core workforce (the so -called ‗insiders‘) will demand that the 
government offers protection from an increasing loss in social security. The focus on a single 
dimension, which implicitly underlies most research on welfare state reforms and change 
(e.g. by Kittel and Obinger, 2003; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Swank, 2005), thus neglects 
important  aspects  about  the  content  of  a  reform  (i.e.  the  size  of  compensation/changes 
within  the  redistributive  dimension),  and,  more  importantly,  fails  to  capture  important 
ideological  differences  among  political  actors.  To  concentrate  on  redistribution  or  the 
redistributive generosity of social policies as the second dimension of interest is justified by 
recent empirical evidence. Individuals demand more redistributive policies because they are 
increasingly exposed to economic risks (Rehm, 2009). Taking into account more dimensions 
than  just  expenditures  therefore  should  yield  different  predictions  about  the  role  of  party 
politics on welfare state reforms than the widely used one-dimensional conceptualization.  
This flexibility that governments have on a second social policy dimension is important when 
we analyze the role of parties across institutional settings. Although institutional analyses of 
social  policymaking  are  very  popular  (e.g.  Steinmo  and  Tolbert,  1998;  Immergut,  1992; 
Crepaz and Moser, 2004; Obinger et al., 2005), they usually do not take into account how 
the role of parties differs across institutional settings.
4 Whether or not a party government 
                                                       
2 This assumption largely reflects the findings of the last decade (e.g. Castles, 1998; Huber and Stephens, 2001; 
Kittel and Obinger, 2003; Kwon and Pontusson, 2005). 
3  Labor market  ‗outsiders‘  largely  consist  of  unskilled  labor,  long-term  unemployed  people  relying  on  social 
assistance, people in public employment schemes, to some extent part-time workers and immigrants also belong to 
this category. These groups are often underrepresented by organized interests. 
4  Two exceptions are Green -Pedersen (2002; 2001) and Bonoli (2001) who both offer a partial framework of 
contingent effects of particular party governments and the institutional framework for the politics of retrenchment. 4 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
has a significant impact on the further development of welfare states is not only contingent 
on the state of the economy and societal factors, but also depends on the institutional setting 
of a country.
5 The presence or absence of institutional and political constraints in a country 
therefore enables or hinders parties in opposition and organized interests to pressure the 
incumbent to move closer towards their preferred policies. However , the constraining effect 
of institutions is likely to differ across parties in government. This means that institutions 
constrain left-wing governments differently from right -wing parties in power. Constraints in 
this paper are broadly defined as formal i nstitutional constraints present in a country (such 
as a powerful second chamber of parliament or the federal organization of a country) and 
political constraints (such as powerful trade unions strongly vested with the social democratic 
party) that restrict governments in their capacity to implement their most preferred policy.
6 
The effect of government change and the policies implemented therefore differ in high - and 
low-constraints countries. The following paragraphs first discuss the mediating effects of  
political constraints for both types of government. As I start from the assumption that different 
party governments must reduce or at least stabilize spending, the reform mechanisms 
principally work through the redistributive dimension. I expect that both , left- and right-wing 
governments implement retrenching elements in their reforms, but that significant differences 
exist with respect to the redistributive elements implemented depending on the countries 
institutional structure. Figure 1 and 2 summarize  the theoretical argument presented in the 
following paragraphs.  
Left-wing governments in countries with little institutional and political constraints tend to 
implement  welfare  state  reforms  that  stabilize  overall  spending,  but  at  the  same  time 
compensate workers and people that are negatively affected by globalization and structural 
change by increasing transfers towards these groups. This is in line with recent empirical 
research, which shows that leftist governments aim at implementing more egalitarian policies 
and try to decrease inequality within society (see e.g. Brady and Leicht, 2008; Boix, 1998). 
For this reason, left-wing governments may be more successful than right-wing governments 
in implementing social policy reforms. When social democratic go vernments attempt to cut 
expenditures in times of fiscal constraints the affected segments of the electorate tend to 
‗trust‘ left-wing government more, i.e. workers assume that left-wing governments do not cut 
social spending more than necessary. By offering compensation for those who lose from 
retrenchment measures through greater redistribution, left-wing governments can also signal 
                                                       
5 The importance of institutions for social policies is well established in comparative political economy (see e.g. 
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Steinmo and Tolbert, 1998; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1998; Hall, 1997; Steinmo, 1989).  
6 The presented framework comes closest to Immergut‘s (1990; 1992) notion of veto-points. It differs from Tsebelis‘ 
veto-player framework (1995; 1999) because the capacity to produce political change is not solely dependent on the 
political system but also on the partisanship of the incumbent. The mechanisms proposed in this paper also differ 
from ‗New Politics‘ literature, which is heavily based on institutionalist arguments. However, the factors crucial to 
Pierson‘s  framework  (2001;  1996;  1994)  is  the  institutional  stickiness  of  existing  social  security  schemes  that 
influence  the  further  development  and  reforms  (path-dependency).  The  formal  institutional  setting  and  party 
struggles are of limited importance.  I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 5 
their concern for the interests of the core workforce and the main ‗losers‘ of globalization, i.e. 
unskilled labor and people that are not part of the core work force. A left-wing government 
thus can gain politically even from a reform that includes retrenchment measures if it offers 
compensation through an increase of the redistributive generosity of the major social security 
schemes.  
Figure 1: Redistributive generosity mediated by political constraints – Implications for 
‘Insiders’ 
    Constraints 
    low  high 
Government 
left  medium  large 
right  low  low 
 
When institutional and political constraints are large, the logic of the policymaking process 
for  left-wing  incumbents  changes.  Social  democratic  governments  still  receive  greater 
potential  support  when  reforming  social  policies,  but  they  also  have  to  accommodate 
conservative forces and must design the social policy reforms accordingly. For instance, the 
government may have to offer greater retrenchment to the conservative opposition to reach 
an agreement. More retrenching measures are against the interests of the core workforce, 
and labor unions will oppose such a reform and may take actions against such a plan. Labor 
unions  can  pressure  the  government  through  extra-parliamentary  actions,  such  as 
demonstrations  or  strikes,  or  by  activating  union  members  that  are  also  members  of 
parliament.
7  In addition to greater retrenchment, the government then has to offer more 
compensation to the constituencies of labor unions, which generally are skilled workers that 
are well-integrated into the working process, the so -called ‗insiders‘ (Rueda, 2005, 2007, 
2006).  In  other  words,  to  achieve  greater  retrenchment,  the  left-wing  government  has  to 
make sure that ‗insiders‘ are not affected too much by the reform. However, to increase the 
redistributive generosity for ‗insiders‘, the government cannot increase the tax burden of the 
wealthy because this would provoke the resistance of the right-wing/conservative opposition. 
                                                       
7 As  an  example,  during the  12th  legislative  period,  over  70  percent  of the social  democratic members  of  the 
German parliament were also union members (1990–1994). This figure even increased to over 80 percent during 
the  14th  legislative  period  (1999–2003).  On  the  other  side,  the  share  of  Christian  democratic  members  of 
parliament, which were also members of a labor union decreased from 7.5 percent to 1 percent, between the 12th 
and the 14th legislative period, respectively (Trampusch, 2003, p. 92). 6 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
A  possible  solution  is  a  disproportionate  retrenchment  on  the  side  of  ‗outsiders‘,  i.e.  the 
unskilled  without  regular  employment,  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  well-integrated  core 
workforce and, at the same time, achieve a sufficient reduction in social expenditures to 
accommodate the opposition.
8 In contrast, in a political system with less constraints, a left -
wing  government  does  not  need  to  accommodate  conservative  parties.  Moreover,  the 
government  may  face  less  pressure  from  lobbying  groups  representing  ‗insiders‘.  This 
implies  that  in  such  a  less  constraining  system  left-wing  party  governments  are  able  to 
propose  and  implement  reforms  that  redistribute  the  available  resources  in  a  more 
egalitarian  way.  In  such  a  system,  the  compensation  measures  are  likely  to  be  directed 
towards all segments of the labor force and not only towards the core social programs that 
mainly  benefit  the  core  workforce  represented  by  powerful  organized  interest.  In  high 
constraints  countries,  we  should  see  greater  distribution  towards  ‗insiders‘,  while  in  low 
constraints countries, we should see less redistribution that is particularly directed towards 
the well-integrated workforce. 
Figure 2: Redistributive generosity mediated by political constraints – implications for 
‘outsiders’ 
    Constraints 
    low  high 
Government 
left  large  medium/low 
right  low  (low) 
 
Adapting  the  same  logic  to  right-wing  governments,  we  should  expect  that  right-wing 
governments  that  face  few  institutional  constraints  tend  to  decrease  spending  without 
compensating  the  losers  of  the  reform.  It  is  widely  acknowledged  that  right-wing 
governments – during the times of welfare state expansion and development – preferred less 
expansive social policies than social democratic governments. Similarly, in times of fiscal 
constraints,  conservative  governments  still  prefer  less  expansive  policies  because  they 
intend to lower the tax burden for reforms and capital owners to increase economic growth. 
With regard to the second dimension, right-wing governments do not have much interest in 
                                                       
8  ‗Outsiders‘,  i.e.  unskilled  labor,  long-term  unemployed  people  relying  on  social  assistance,  people  in  public 
employment schemes, to some extent part-time workers and immigrants are often underrepresented by organized 
interests. I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 7 
compensating  particular  groups  in  society,  but  mainly  focus  on  retrenching  policies.  In 
countries  with  little  institutional  constraints  and  few  or  no  access  points  for  extra-
parliamentarian actors to the decision-making arena, right-wing governments can implement 
their  preferred  policy  without  the  consideration  of  special  interests.  Conservative 
governments, which are constrained, tend to end up with social policy reforms that bring little 
change both in terms of retrenchment and redistributive generosity because of the pressure 
that  interest  groups  –  mainly  labor  unions  and,  for  right-wing  governments,  employers‘ 
organizations – exert on the government. In order to implement the necessary retrenching 
measures, the government would have to compensate special interest groups in a society, 
mainly organized labor. Labor unions demand measures, which alleviate the effect of the 
retrenching measures of the reform on their constituencies. However, these measures are 
against the interest of employers‘ organizations that are close to the conservative party in 
power. The compensation of the core workforce, however, is not attractive for a right-wing 
government,  because  the  political  gains  from  such  a  strategy  in  electoral  competition  is 
small.  Since social policy  and  welfare state  issues  are traditionally occupied  by  left-wing 
parties, conservative parties cannot credibly offer policy solutions that are similar to those of 
left-wing parties. The distributive effect of right-wing party governments in countries with high 
constraints therefore is low or at least remains unclear.
9 
                                                       
9 Recent empirical research by Jensen (2010) shows that right-wing governments tend to even spend more on 
social welfare because the public in general does not trust right-wing governments when it comes to social policies. 
However, this study does not examine the impact of conservative/right-wing governments on various segments of 
labor market participants. Empirically, the policy position and the impact of right-wing governments on labor market 
‗outsiders‘ remain unclear and should be subject for further research. 8 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
2. Research Design 
The  selection  of  cases  to  empirically  examine  the  theoretical  argument  and  to  trace  the 
underlying processes follows a two-step procedure. First, I rely on the results of a preceding 
quantitative  analysis  (Hübscher,  2009).  This  analysis  focused  on  the  effect  of  left-party 
governments  on  social  policies  towards  labor  market  ‗insiders‘  and  largely  confirms  the 
hypothesized  relationships.  The  study,  however,  largely  ignores  the  role  of  labor  market 
‗outsiders‘  in  this  process and  does  not  verify  whether the  postulated mechanism in fact 
leads  to  these  results.  Following  a  nested  analysis  design  (Lieberman,  2005),  I  choose 
countries that are well explained by the quantitative analysis to substantiate the theoretical 
mechanisms described in the previous section in a manifold way.
10 First, I examine to what 
extent the policy positions of government parties in the two -dimensional social policy space 
are consistent with those underlying the theoretical discussion. Second, the case studies 
analyze the policymaking process of each reform in detail by focusing on the joint effect of 
institutions,  political  constraints  and  party  governments  on  social  policies  vis -à-vis 
‗outsiders‘.
11 
The second step in the case selection procedure is to select countries that show variation on 
the  key  independent  variables  (Geddes,  2003).  Since  I  expect  that  the  level  of  political 
constraints together with the party affiliation of the incumbent government affect the outcome 
of a reform, the countries included in the case study must have different levels of political 
constraints and varying party governments. Germany and Ireland both fulfill these criteria. In 
Germany,  the  level  of  political  constraints  is  high  because  the  formal  institutional  setting 
(federalism and a second chamber of parliament) allows opposition parties and lower-level 
state authorities to influence or block policy proposals. Moreover, influential interest groups 
have strong personal ties to political parties and can access the policymaking procedure in 
various ways (Trampusch, 2003; Streeck, 2003). The Irish political system, on the contrary, 
has  little  political  constraints  that  inhibit  the  policymaking  process  (Chari  and  McMahon, 
2003;  Connolly  and  O‘Halpin,  1999),  e.g.  Ireland  is  a  unitarian  state  where  regional 
authorities  have  very  limited  competences.  Even  though  Ireland  also  has  a  bicameral 
system, the Seanad (the second parliamentary chamber) has little power in the legislative 
processes. Moreover the Taoiseach has the right to appoint eleven senators, which means 
that the governing coalition always has the majority in the Upper Chamber. 
Finally, I select two social policy reforms in each country, one that was implemented by a 
conservative government and another one by a left-wing government. For Germany, I will 
analyze  the  ‗Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz‘  (employment  promotion  act)  and  the 
JobAQTIV law in 1994 and 2001, respectively. For Ireland, I choose the Financial and Social 
                                                       
10 The results are available from the author. 
11 The terms ‗change‘ and ‗impact‘ are understood in a qualitative manner and I will not measure the impact the 
examined reforms had on different groups using individual level or macro-economic indicators. I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 9 
Welfare  Bills  in  1996  and  2001.
12  The first reform in Germany was implemented by a 
conservative coalition government between the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the 
Liberals (FDP) led by Helmut Kohl. The second reform was designed by the coalition 
government between the Social Democrats  (SPD) and the Green Party under chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder. The Irish Financial and  Social Welfare Bill of 1996 was  presented by a 
left-wing coalition government consisting of Fine Gael, Labour and the Democratic Left 
(‗rainbow coalition‘). Despite the fact that the existence of the classical left-right dimension 
has been contested in the context of Ireland, the ‗rainbow coalition‘ can be labeled as left-
wing  government  because  the  Democratic  left,  which  had  a  significant  impact  on  the 
government‘s  policymaking,  corresponds  to  traditional  left-wing  parties  present  on  the 
continent.
13 In 2001, the reform was implemented by a conservative government consisting 
of Fianna Fàil and the Progressive Democrats. 
To empirically analyze the reform processes, I evaluate the content of parliamentary minutes 
and legislative documents.
14  Unlike in Germany, where the reforms exclusively address 
unemployment and labor market issues, social policy issues affecting the labor market are 
not treated separately in a single legislative act in Ireland. Social policy issues are included 
in two major legislative bills, the Financial and Social Welfare Bills. I analyze the annual 
parliamentary discussions related to the Financial and the Social Welfare Bills in the Dàil 
Éirann (the Irish parliament). From these bills, I single out the relevant issues related to 
unemployment and labor market policymaking. 
The  issues  of  interests  are  primarily  changes  that  affect  various  aspects  related  to 
unemployment insurance schemes, such as eligibility, benefits and contributory issues but 
also reforms affecting the functioning of the labor market, such as the implementation of 
placement agencies or measures inducing more flexibility of the labor market. In addition to 
the parliamentary minutes, I also add evidence from committee hearings (f or Germany) and 
newspapers (Ireland) to include the policy positions of the relevant extra parliamentarian 
actors.
15 This is useful to substantiate the policy positions of the extra parliamentarian actors, 
mainly  trade  unions  and  employers‘  organizations,  because  the  committee  stage  of  the 
legislative process in Ireland has very little impact on the design of the draft and, unlike in 
                                                       
12 Because the reforms analyzed in this study should be related as closely to the precedent quantitative analysis, I 
choose reforms that were designed and implemented before 2002. My quantitative analysis ends in 2002. 
13 On the Irish party system and its particularities and similarities with continental European party systems (see e.g. 
Mair, 1987; Laver, 1992; Gilland Lutz, 2003). 
14 The documents (parliamentary minutes, legislative proposals, and reports) for the German case studies are 
accessible online on http://dip.bundestag.de. The minutes of the committee hearings can be obtained from the 
parliamentary services. The parliamentary minutes of the Irish Dàil Éirann have been extracted from http://historical-
debates.oireachtas.ie/index.html. 
15 The newspaper articles were selected from the Irish Times. The content of the Irish times  is included in the 
LexisNexis data base. I used the following key words: unemployment, social welfare, labor market. I selected 
articles that were published up to two months before the respective bill was discussed in parliament and articles 
published during the period the bills were discussed in the Dàil. 10 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
Germany, the committee system is less institutionalized, and the committees varied over 
time. Besides the original positions of political parties and intentions of party governments at 
the  outset  of  the  reform,  I  analyze  how  the  original  reform  plan  changed  during  the 
policymaking  process,  and  whether  and  how  labor  market  ‗outsiders‘  and  ‗insiders‘  are 
affected by the final bill that was approved by the legislature. In the subsequent empirical 
part, the core issues of the reforms are assigned to one of the two dimensions, redistributive 
generosity or spending, and summarized in tables  2 through 5 in the next two sections. 
Issues  assigned  to  the  redistributive  dimension  have  in  common  that  they  affect  the 
redistributive  generosity  of  programs  by  altering  benefits  or  contributions  relative  to  an 
individual‘s income, and/or are directed towards specific groups (e.g. higher income groups). 
Issues  attributed  to  the  expenditure  dimension  either  affect  every  individual  equally  (e.g. 
general cuts of benefits, cut in the duration of benefits) or aim at increasing the efficiency of 
the labor market by implementing active labor market policies and outsourcing services to 
private agencies (see table 1).I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 11 
Table 1: Reform Issues 
Redistributive Issues  Expenditure Issues 
Issue  Description  Issue   Description 
Benefits Compared to 
Previous Income 
Unemployment insurance benefits often 
depend on previous earnings. The level of 
benefits sets the rate to which extent the 
original income will be replaced by 
unemployment benefits in case of job loss. 
This is a matter of redistribution if low 
incomes get a higher percentage of their 
previous income than individuals with a high 
previous income (or benefits for people in 
high income brackets are subject to a 
maximum benefit). 
Duration of Benefits 
Unemployed people are eligible for 
unemployment benefits during a certain 
period only. Shortening or extending the 
duration of benefits influences the 
expenditure dimension. 
Contributions Relative 
to Income 
The contributory rates can be different for 
employees given a particular income. A 
related issue is how the contributions are 
split between employee and employer and 
whether there are different contributory rates 
for different income levels. 
Public Funding 
Unemployment insurance schemes are 
mostly financed through contributions from 
employers and employees. However, a minor 
part of the insurance scheme is covered by 
the state and usually, the state also provides 
deficit guarantee. Higher/lower coverage by 
the state leads to more/less public 
expenditure. 
Eligibility 
The inclusion of new groups into the 
unemployment insurance scheme leads to a 
broader coverage of employees. Reforms 
can also exclude groups of employees (e.g. 
employees with salaries above or below a 
certain threshold, part-time employees, etc.). 
Eligibility is also related to the length of the 
necessary contributory period. 
Active Labor Market 
Policies (ALMP) 
Most labor market/unemployment insurance 
reforms nowadays include ALMP measures. 
Often, these policies aim at re-integrating 
unemployed people in the labor market more 
efficiently. The aim is to unburden the 
insurance scheme and ultimately to cut 
expenditures. Also included in this category is 
the establishment of (privately organized) 
regional placement centers with the aim of 
closer monitoring and lowering the costs of 
placing unemployed people. 12 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
3. Labor market reforms in Germany and Ireland 
3.1 Germany 
Employment Promotion Law 1994 (‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’) 
The  ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’  was one  of the first legislations focusing on  active 
labor  market  policies  in  Germany.  The  Bill  was  presented  by  the  conservative 
CDU/CSU/FDP government, which aimed at addressing the persistently high unemployment 
and the rigidity of the German labor market. The following issues were included in the reform 
proposal:  First,  part-time  jobs  should  be  promoted  by  compensating  employees  when 
changing  from  a  full-time  to  a  part-time  job  or  accepting  a  part-time  job  after  being 
unemployed. Second, to increase self-employment and create jobs, the government offered 
additional six months of unemployment benefits for people  who start their own business. 
Both measures were intended to be financed through the unemployment insurance scheme. 
Third, the maximum income of a person working in a public employment scheme (so-called 
‘Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen’) should not exceed 80 percent of the salary a person in a 
regular  work  relationship  would  earn,  and  fourth,  private  placement  centers  were 
established. According to the theoretical framework presented in the previous section, the 
analysis should result in the overall conclusion that the privileges of the core workforce will 
be largely preserved and that ‗outsiders‘, such as contractors and part-time employees, did 
not  significantly  benefit  from  this  reform.  As  table  2  indicates,  most  of  the  adjustments 
implemented by the conservative party government only minimally reduced the privileges of 
the core workforce. The redistributive generosity of the unemployment insurance scheme 
was hardly affected by the ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’. However, due to the budgetary 
pressure,  the  reform  as  a  whole  had  to  be  cost  neutral,  the  least. This  aim was  mainly 
achieved by reducing the salaries for people working in public employment schemes, which 
compensated the additional costs caused by promoting part-time work and self-employment 
through unemployment insurance schemes. 
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Table 2: Reform Issues and Direction of Changes ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’ 
  Effect on  Dimension 
Reform Issue  ‗Insiders‘  ‗Outsiders‘  Redistribution  Expenditure 
Promotion of part-time work (3 
year top up if person takes a 
part-time job after being 
unemployed or changes from 
full-time to part-time 
employment) 
+  -  X 
 
Start up help 
(‗Überbrückungsgeld‘), 
additional six months of 
unemployment benefits when 
starting a business 
+  -  X   
Reducing the salaries for 
participants in public 
employment schemes 
+  -    X 
Private placement centers  +  Neutral    X 
 
Legend:  +  implicates  that  the  implemented  measure  had  a  positive  effect  for  the  group 
indicated. – implicates that the reform negatively effects ‗insiders‘/‘outsiders‘. 
Several elements, such as the promotion of part-time jobs and self-employment should result 
in an increase in overall labor market participation. This aim was particularly accentuated by 
the  liberal  party  (FDP).  The  need  for  more  part-time  jobs  and  the  involvement  of  larger 
segments  of  society  in  the  labor  market  was  widely  acknowledged  by  the  parties  in 
opposition.  Yet,  the  manner  how  the  government  planned  to  increase  labor  market 
participation and part-time jobs was sharply criticized. Members of the social democrats and 
the Green party stressed that the envisaged aim of increasing the number of part-time jobs 
would in the end be at the expenses of the core workforce, which would increasingly need to 
give up social rights, which were often tied to regular employment relationships. To minimize 
the  negative  effects  that  the  reform  would  have  on  the  core  workforce,  the  government 
offered to compensate employees with regular work arrangements and unemployed people, 
who  change  from  a  full-time  to  a  part-time  job. The  compensation  offered  was  a  further 
payment of unemployment insurance benefits (over three years) to even out the difference 
between a full salary and a salary paid to a part-time employed person. 
The promotion of self-employment should also increase labor market participation, and in the 
long run even create additional jobs. Similarly to the governmental support of part-time jobs, 
unemployed people who decided to start their own business were offered compensation in 
the form of additional six months of unemployment insurance benefits. This capital should 
encourage  entrepreneurial  people  and  help  them  through  the  first  months  of  their  self-
employment. The main beneficiaries from this legislative change were the well-educated and 
skilled people (core  workforce), who  lost their job or decided to start something on their 14 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
own.
16 People with little education and vocational training often do not have the expertise 
and know-how to launch a business or fail to be successful in the long run. Whereas German 
labor unions, together with the social democrats, asked for an extension of the planned six 
months assistance, the employer‘s organizations opposed this part of the legislation because 
‘the allocation of financial means for start-up firms and to encourage self-employment is not 
a  core  task  of  the  unemployment  insurance  scheme  and  their  contributors’,  (written 
statement  to  the  ‘Ausschuss  für  Arbeit  und  Soziales’).
17  Overall,  the  eff orts  by  the 
government to reduce costs and increase labor market participation hardly affected ‗insiders‘ 
negatively. Their privileges and the redistributive generosity of the unemployment insurance 
scheme were preserved and some of the changes even improved their standing in the labor 
market, e.g. the immediate eligibility to participate in training and qualification measures after 
losing the job certainly  helps unemployed  people to improve and  adapt their  skills,  what 
makes it more attractive to hire them. 
The legislative  proposal did not  include measures, which  were exclusively  targeted labor 
market ‗outsiders‘. On the contrary, the decision to cut salaries paid to people working in 
public  employment  schemes  in  order  to  finance  the  promotion  of  part-time  jobs  and  to 
increase labor market participation had a negative effect on these groups of society. The 
salary cuts were framed as ‘increasing the incentives for people working in the so-called ‘2nd 
labor  market’  to  re-integrate  themselves  in  the  competitive  first  labor  market’ 
(Gesetzesentwurf  ,  17.05.1994,  p.  9,  Beschlussempfehlung  und  Bericht  – Ausschuss  für 
Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 13.04.1994, p. 27) by the government. The parties in opposition 
strongly opposed this change. The social democrats accused the government to ‘suspend 
tariff  autonomy  and  to  establish  low-wage  jobs  by  law  [...]’,  (Renate  Jaeger,  SPD, 
parliamentary  minutes,  14.04.1994,  p.  18944).  The  20  percent  cuts  in  salary  finally 
established must be seen as a compromise, because the employer‘s organization pressured 
the government to cut salaries by 50 percent and even criticized the governing coalition that 
it would not exploit its room to maneuver (written statement to the ‘Ausschuss für Arbeit und 
Soziales’ by the DIHT). 
The private placement centers should help to decrease public expenditure and pressure the 
public  job  agencies  to  work  more  efficiently.  It  was  also  expected  that  the  private  job 
agencies  will  be  better  able  to  establish  close  ties  with  business  and  therefore  be  more 
successful in placing unemployed people as fast as possible. Though the service was open 
to everyone, the opposition argued that ‘unemployed people which are hard to place will be 
left  behind,  depending  on  the  public  placement  centers,  whereas  unemployed  with  more 
                                                       
16 Evidence from more recent start-up programmes show that only a small percentage of needy people start their 
own  business  (Wolff  and  Nivorozhkin,  2008)  and  though  these  self-employment  programmes  of  the  German 
government have been positively evaluated, studies show that a large percentage of the recipients are male and 
have qualifications and skills above average (Caliendo et al., 2007). 
17 All translations by the author. I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 15 
options  will  be  placed  through  private  centers’,  (parliamentary  minutes,  14.04.1994,  p. 
18936). Therefore, the main beneficiaries will be skilled and well-educated people who lost 
their job. 
Mediating Effects of Political Constraints 
At the time when the ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’ was debated in the two chambers, 
the  conservative  government  was  constrained  by  a  majority  of  the  opposition  in  the 
‘Bundesrat’ (second chamber of parliament), which is the most important veto player in the 
legislative process and consists of the representatives of the federal states. The SPD-led 
opposition was represented by 9 SPD members as opposed to 7 for the conservative parties 
in government. The initial bill as proposed by the government was heavily criticized by the 
SPD,  the  Green  Party  and  the  PDS/Linke  Liste  in  the  ‘Bundestag’  and  would  not  have 
passed  the  SPD-dominated  second  chamber  of  parliament.  However,  there  was 
disagreement whether the law needed the approval by the second chamber of parliament to 
pass in the first place. Whereas the government parties claimed that the reform proposal did 
not  need  the  approval  by  the  second  chamber,  the  opposition  parties  insisted  that  the 
legislative proposal included changes, which concern the competences of the states and 
thus requires the approval by the second chamber of parliament. Oskar Lafontaine (SPD), 
prime minister of Saarland and leader of the social democratic party, denied the support for 
reform proposal. Consequentially, the bill was rejected by the left-wing majority. 
After the defeat in the second chamber of parliament, the ‘Ausschuss für Arbeit und Soziales’ 
in the ‘Bundestag’ quickly redrafted the reform and eliminated the paragraphs falling under 
the competence of the states. The disputed issues were integrated into a separate reform 
plan and postponed to be implemented at a later point. This strategic move allowed the 
coalition  government  to  circumvent  the  second  chamber  of  parliament  and  prevented  a 
blockade of the reform process. Although the SPD-led ‘Bundesländer’ and the opposition 
parties in the parliament opposed this strategic maneuver, their hands were tied and the 
reform was finally approved after the fourth reading of the bill in the parliament. Because of 
the intervention by the parties in opposition in the second chamber of parliament, the reform 
as a whole did not dismantle the unemployment insurance scheme as such, e.g. it did not 
alter  the  contribution  scheme  or  the  entitlements  for  regularly  unemployed  people  and 
therefore affected the core of the redistributive scheme in minor parts only. One reason why 
the government coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FPD was not able to draft and 
propose a reform with a more radical impact on the redistributive scheme was the lack of 
support  for  the  government‘s  proposal  in  the  second  chamber  of  parliament.  The 
implementation  of  the  ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’  by  the  conservative  government 
shows that a more retrenching reform at the expense of the core workforce was politically 
not  possible,  mainly  because  the  political  constraints  that  the  government  faced  in  the 
second chamber was too large. 16 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
The political cleavages in the debates of this reform process correspond to the assumption 
made in the theoretical section. The government was under great pressure to reform the 
labor market in order to stabilize the social insurance scheme and ameliorate the general 
conditions on the labor market. The main issues included in the ‗Beschäftigungsförderungs-
gesetz’ aimed at cutting expenditures for labor market policies and reducing the redistributive 
and  encompassing  effect  of  labor  market  policies.  Most  measures,  however,  indirectly 
affected  unemployed  people  negatively  and  made  it  more  difficult  for  people  with  little 
education  and professional skills to find a new job.
18 In the end, th e reform only offered 
superficial solutions to a more complex problem, which  was the rigidity of the German labor 
market and the ongoing structural change of the German economy. However, due to the 
partisan constellations in the important policymaking bodi es, a more encompassing reform 
was not possible. 
‘Gesetz  zur  Reform  der  Arbeitsmarktpolitischen  Instrumente  2001’  (Job-
AQTIV) 
Similar  to  the  preceding  conservative  government,  the  coalition  between  the  Social 
Democrats and the Green party also experienced  significant reform pressure because of 
high unemployment figures and a high budgetary deficit. The reform of the labor market and 
a significant decrease in unemployment thus were central issues of the social-democratic 
election  campaign  and  also  a  cornerstone  of  the  subsequent  coalition  treaty.  Table  3 
summarizes  the  major  reform  issues  associated  with  the  ‗Job-AQTIV‘  legislation.  The 
overarching goal of the ‗Job-AQTIV‘ reform was to lower the duration of unemployment by 
increasing labor market flexibility through more vocational training and education measures 
for people in and out of employment.
19 In addition, the reform also aimed at increasing the 
efficiency of the job placement centers by establishing improved reintegration procedures for 
unemployed people. 
   
                                                       
18 Gregor Gysi (PDS/Linke Liste): ‘I do not criticize the fact that the government aims at cutting expenditure or to 
open up new sources of income, I criticize that this reform is mainly at the expenses of the weakest members of our 
society while the wealthy are always treated with care’, (see parliamentary minutes, 14.04.1994, p. 18935). 
19 The name of the reform AQTIV is an abbreviation that summarizes the main goals of the legislative proposal: A = 
Aktivierung (activation), Q = Qualifizierung (qualification), T = Trainieren (training), I = Investieren (investment), V = 
Vermitteln (brokerage/improved placement). I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 17 
Table 3: Reform Issues and Direction of Changes ‘Job-AQTIV 2001’ 
  Effect on  Dimension 
Reform Issue  ‗Insiders‘  ‗Outsiders‘  Redistribution  Expenditure 
Secure work for specific 
groups (elderly/young people) 
by offering them the 
opportunity to participate in 
training measures 
+  +/-  X   
Job-rotation scheme 
(unemployed person – 
temporarily – takes the job of a 
person that participates in 
qualifying measures 
+  +  X  X 
Subsidies for employers/firms if 
temporarily employing long-
term unemployed people 
-  +    X 
Implementation of degressive 
elements to the unemployment 
assistance scheme (if person 
declines a job, declines to 
participate in additional 
vocational training) 
Neutral  -    X 
Increase of the maximum 
period temporary employment 
(‗Leiharbeit‘) is allowed 
+/-  +/-    X 
 
Overall,  the  ‗Job-AQTIV‘  legislation  reflects  the  general  direction  of  labor  market 
policymaking  under  a  leftist  government  as  outlined  by  my  theoretical  argument.  The 
government aimed at re-activating unemployed people, reintegrate labor market ‗outsiders‘ 
and  employees  and  help  labor  market  participants  with  an  increased  probability  to  lose 
employment  (mainly  elderly  employees).  The  new  policies  were  also  meant  to  focus  on 
integrating  women  and  people  with  lower  skills  and  little  education,  which  contrasts 
traditional labor market policies in Germany, which were mainly directed towards the core 
work force, i.e. the unionized and skilled male population. Though efforts were made, the 
‗Job-AQTIV‘  legislation  did  not  address  these  issues  very  successfully,  a  fact  that  was 
harshly  criticized  by  the  parties  in  opposition. According  to  the  theoretical  framework  we 
should come to the conclusion that the reform will make a strong effort in cutting expenditure 
without significantly helping labor market ‗outsiders‘ and largely preserving the privileges of 
the core workforce. 
The  most  important  issue  included  in  the  ‗Job-AQTIV‘  legislation  was  the  so-called  ‗job-
rotation‘ scheme. This scheme should, on the one hand, help elderly and young people to 
acquire  further  skills,  which  should  secure  their  employment  status  and  increase  their 18 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
competitiveness. On the other hand, long-term unemployed people should get the chance to 
participate  in  ‗on  the  job  training‘,  while  temporarily  taking  over  the  position  of  a  regular 
employee  who  participates  in  training  measures.  Firms  participating  in  the  job-rotation 
scheme will be subsidized by the government. Another measure designed to increase overall 
labor market participation was to extend the period temporary employment is allowed. In 
addition,  private  placement  centers  should  increasingly  engage  in  ‗profiling‘  unemployed 
people and help them to find an adequate job. 
The prime intention of the job-rotation scheme was to help both people with regular work 
arrangements, which are most exposed to the risk of losing their job (young  and elderly 
employees) and labor market ‗outsiders‘, which should be re-integrated. Criticism evolved 
around  the  government‘s  proposition  how  the  additional  vocational  training  should  be 
financed. The intention of the government was to finance the qualifying measures through 
the unemployment insurance scheme. Even though the peak labor union (DGB) agreed that 
additional training was needed, they disapproved the idea to finance the measure through 
the unemployment insurance scheme. Labor unions would have preferred if costs related to 
the  ‗job-rotation‘  scheme  would  be  paid  through  the  tax  system  (statement  by  Ursula 
Engelen-Kefer (DGB) to the ‘Ausschuss für Arbeit und Soziales’ 10.10.2001, p. 9). To pass 
on the costs associated with this legislative change to the general taxpayer would again be 
beneficiary for labor market ‗insiders‘ since financing training measures is not the key task of 
unemployment insurance schemes and additional costs imposed on the scheme increase 
the pressure to adjust benefits paid to people covered by the scheme. Similar to the labor 
unions, the employer‘s organization also opposed the way the scheme should be financed. 
However, in line with their general policy preferences, the additional qualification measures 
should not be financed by employers and employees but be based on the principle of self-
responsibility (minutes ‘Auschuss für Arbeit und Soziales’ 10.10.2001, p. 3). The impact of 
the ‗job-rotation‘ scheme for labor market ‗outsiders‘ is mixed. On the one hand, labor market 
‗outsiders‘ are given the chance to be integrated in a regular working environment, on the 
other hand, the period is strictly limited and there is no guarantee that the person finds a 
follow-up job.
20 
Bridging the gap between long-term unemployed people and people in the first labor market 
was seen as a necessity by all parties. The job -rotation scheme, however, was criticized as 
‘inflating  the  bureaucracy  in  the  job  placement  centers’  (FDP,  CDU/CSU  and  peak-
employer‘s organization). The FDP also stressed that small and medium firms will fear the 
costs to participate in the scheme. To combine the further education of targeted groups with 
the (re)-integration of ‗outsiders‘ was also criticized, because job-rotation should only be an 
instrument  to  re-integrate  people  and  not  offering  (additional)  qualification  measures  for 
‗insiders‘. In the view of the employer‘s representatives, the legislation as proposed by the 
                                                       
20  The  +/-  in  the  table  summarizing  the  impact  of  the  implemented  measures  for  labor  market  ‗insiders‘  and 
‗outsiders‘ implicates the ambivalent impact of the job-rotation scheme for labor market ‗outsiders‘. I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 19 
government put too much emphasis on training measures.
21 Rather than activating the labor 
market  through  the  job -rotation  scheme,  the  opposition  would  have  preferred  a  more 
encompassing  and  drastic  reform  of  the  lab or  market,  including  severe  cuts  in 
unemployment benefits and contributions. Especially the liberal party argued that job security 
would increase with the further deregulation of the whole labor market and lower costs 
associated  with  employment  (Irmgard  Sc hwaetzer,  FDP:  ‘Why  doesn’t  the  government 
acknowledge that for most employees a decrease of their salary would be better than losing 
their job entirely?’, parliamentary minutes, 27.09.2001, p. 18519). 
The  controversially  discussed  extension  of  temporary  employment  (‘Leiharbeit’)  should 
increase labor market participation and especially help people employed in low-wage sectors 
keeping their job. The plan to include workers with temporary contracts in the job-rotation 
scheme  was  sharply  criticized  by  labor  unions  and  the  PDS/Die  Linke.  Both,  the  leftist 
political  party  and  the  labor  unions  were  generally  skeptical  regarding  temporary 
employment,  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  temporary  contract  would  undermine  wage 
bargaining autonomy and boost the low-wage sector. To include temporary employed people 
in the job-rotation scheme was seen as a subsidy for the contracting agencies and part of 
the  labor  unions  (e.g.  IG-Metall)  feared  that  instead  of  securing  employment  for  elderly 
workers, the inclusion of contractors would in the end crowed out the elderly skilled labor 
(see ‘Ausschuss für Arbeit und Sozialordnung’, 10.10.2001, p. 17). 
Though the ‗Job-AQTIV‘ legislation included several attempts to re-integrate ‗outsiders‘ of the 
labor  market,  these  attempts  on  the  redistributive  dimension  directed  at  ‗outsiders‘  were 
moderated  by  the  rather  huge  concessions  made  towards  the  ‗insiders‘.  This  happened 
mainly  through  the  promotion  of  additional  professional  training  –  financed  through  the 
unemployment insurance scheme – for (elderly) employees in regular employment. Similar 
to the ‘Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’, retrenchment should not happen through cuts in 
benefits but through increased efficiency in the placement of the unemployed. Even though 
the parties in opposition called for a more encompassing reform with a more retrenching 
effect on the social insurance schemes (especially the combination of the unemployment 
assistance  and  social  assistance  scheme),  the  governing  coalition  did  not  include  these 
suggestions.
22 
                                                       
21 ‘We have to make it very clear that the ‘job-rotation-scheme’ has to enhance the chances for unemployed people 
on the labor market and should not be used for targeted training measures beneficiary to employees’, (written 
statement to the ‘Ausschuss für Arbeit und Sozialordnung’, p. 5). 
22 It can be argued that since the government was under pressure to cut expenditure, it might have tried to impose 
more financial burden to the sub-national units, e.g. shortening the period of unemployment insurance benefits are 
paid, often lead to an increase in social assistance payments. Social assistance however, is administrated through 
the ‗Länder‘ and therefore a change would have needed the support of the ‗Länderkammer‘. 20 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
Mediating Effects of Political Constraints 
The content as well as the timing of the ‗Job-AQTIV‘ legislation was influenced by several 
types  of  constraints.  First,  the  government  had  to  signal  to  the  electorate  that  the 
announcements made during the electoral campaign in 1998 to reform the labor market and 
to significantly decrease the level of unemployment were not only empty promises. However, 
the  reason  why  the  government  was  reluctant  to  engage  in  reform  activities  earlier  – 
especially to propose reforms that significantly affected the redistributive generosity towards 
‗insiders‘ – was motivated by the fear that the labor unions would withdraw from the ‘Bündnis 
für Arbeit, Ausbildung und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit‘ (Alliance for Jobs). The cautious design of 
the reform and the fact that the government was very considerate towards the needs of the 
labor  unions  led  to  criticism  by  the  parties  in  opposition.  Irmgard  Schwaetzer  (FDP),  for 
example, urged the government to ‘wake up’ and to ‘end the flirtatious relationship with the 
labor  unions,  which  is  having  a  catastrophic  impact  on  the  unemployed’,  (parliamentary 
minutes, 27.09.2001, p. 18519). Second, the fact that the second chamber of parliament was 
dominated by the opposition parties had an important impact on the original reform plans. As 
Manow  and  Burkhart  (2007)  show,  in  situations  were  governments  are  divided,  the 
incumbent  anticipate  the  veto  of  the  second  chamber  and  draft  the  reform  proposals 
accordingly, e.g. restrain themselves in order to avoid the blockage of legislative processes. 
According to the theoretical argument, reforms by a leftist government that is constraint by 
the  institutional  setting  and  its  close  ties  to  labor  unions  should  lead  in  disproportional 
retrenchment  on  the  back  of  labor  market  ‗outsiders‘  and  preferential  treatment  of  labor 
market  ‗insiders‘.  The  empirical  evidence  presented  in  the  previous  paragraphs  largely 
confirms  these  expectations.  Even  though  the  government  should  have  cut  expenditure 
more (according to the opposition parties), the main cuts implemented only affected people 
living from unemployment assistance. Regular unemployment insurance benefits, which are 
directed  towards  ‗insiders‘,  were  not  affected  by  these  cuts. An  attempt  to  cut  the  latter 
benefits  would  have  resulted  in  a  loss  of  political  support  from  labor  unions  and  their 
representatives in parliament. Other measures, such as the job-rotation scheme, which was 
expected  to  reduce  expenditure  also  worked  in  favor  of  labor  market  ‗insiders‘.  The 
extension  of  temporary  employment  had  a  negative  effect  on  labor  market  ‗outsiders‘. 
Empirical evidence shows that employees with fixed-term contract earn significantly less and 
have difficulties to find a regular job (e.g. Gash, 2008; Giesecke and Gross, 2003).
23 
The legislative change brought by the ‗Job-AQTIV‘ law is an important landmark in German 
labor market policymaking and already included many aspects of the subsequent series of 
reforms known as ‗Hartz-reforms‘ (see e.g. Leschke, Schmid and Griga, 2006; Fleckenstein, 
                                                       
23 Research by Giesecke and Gross (2003) shows that temporary employees risk to end up in a ‗chain of temporary‘ 
jobs and have difficulties finding regular employment. Long sequences of temporary employment deprive individuals 
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2006; Berthold and von Berchem, 2003).
24 The Job-AQTIV legislation was a first shift away 
from a passive system of guaranteeing income security and the commitment to maintain the 
standards of living towards a more active labor market policy, which aimed at activating the 
unemployed and increasing the flexibility of the rigid German labor market. Though the 
Hartz-legislations also included cuts i n benefits for the core workforce and reduced the 
duration unemployment benefit is paid, many of the measures that should open up the labor 
market and decrease the shadow economy, mainly had a negative effect on unskilled labor, 
this is also supported by M artin and Thelen (2007, p.34), who conclude that the Hartz 
reforms deepened the divide between labor market ‗insiders‘ and ‗outsiders‘.
25 The mini- and 
midi-job schemes, for example, do not  offer full social insurance coverage  and therefore 
predominantly reduced the entitlements for ‗outsiders‘.
26 
4.2 Ireland 
Financial and Social Welfare Act 1996 
In 1996, the Irish cabinet consisted of a three party coalition between Fine Gael, Labour and 
the Democratic Left. The Democratic Left was represented with one minister only, De Rossa, 
who was the party leader and served as Minister for Social Welfare within the coalition. The 
social policy reforms presented by the center-left government primarily aimed at addressing 
the  needs  of  the  very  poor,  or  ‗outsiders‘.  De  Rossa,  characterized  the  bill  as  the  ‘first 
integrated approach to address the most pressing social and economic problem, long-term 
unemployment’, (parliamentary minutes, 12.03.1996). Even though the Irish economy was 
booming, long-term unemployment and social inequality was a major problem of the Irish 
economy. The minister for Social Welfare justified the measures proposed in the budget and 
the  welfare  act  that  ‘they  are  intended  to  give  particular  help  to  our  unacceptably  large 
number  of  people  who  are  long-term  unemployed  because  this  group  is  not  benefiting 
enough  from  the  current  dynamic  growth  in  employment’,  (parliamentary  minutes, 
23.01.1996).
27 
                                                       
24 The Hartz reforms further promoted instruments such as the ‗self-employment‘ scheme (known as ‗Ich-AG‘), 
tightened  and  further  enforced  the  ‗capability  to  work‘  definition  and  put  more  emphasis  on  personnel  service 
agencies (temporary job agencies), to name a few. Already discussed during the preparation phase of the Job-
AQTIV legislation but only implemented in the course of Hartz IV was the merger of unemployment assistance and 
social assistance into a single means-tested scheme (see Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst and Grienberger-Zingerle, 2007, 
for an overview over the changes implemented by Hartz I-IV). 
25 According to Kemmerling and Bruttel (2006, p. 106), the retrenchment generated by the Hartz legislations are not 
substantive given the size of the German welfare state. 
26 Mini- and midi-jobs are best suited for people  – mainly married women – who are insured through their partner 
and/or are looking for a part-time job, such as students and people in retirement (see e.g. Leschke, Schmid and 
Griga, 2006; Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst and Grienberger-Zingerle, 2007). 
27 During the parliamentary debate, members of the coalition also emphasized that the social needs of ‗outsiders‘ 
should  finally  be  addressed,  e.g.  Joe  Costello  (Labour  Party)  stated  that  ‘this  is  the  first  time  the  long-term 
unemployment problem has been the main focus of a budget’, and Liz McManus (Democratic Left) pointed out the 
failures of previous governments to help the poor: ‘For decades, social and economic policy has failed to address 22 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
The  overview  in  table  4  already  shows  that  the  majority  of  the  issues  affected  the 
expenditure dimension and was mostly targeted at labor market ‗outsiders‘. In addition, both, 
‗insiders‘  and  ‗outsiders‘  benefited  from  an  overall  increase  in  redistributive  generosity. 
Several  issues  related  to  the  PRSI  scheme  (PRSI  =  payment  related  social  insurance 
scheme), should lead to an increase in the take home pay of employees belonging to the 
low-income bracket, e.g. by exempting the first $80 from the payments to the PRSI scheme) 
while  simultaneously  securing  the  funding  of  the  scheme  by  increasing  the  contributory 
ceiling. 
Table 4: Reform Issues and Direction of Changes for ‘Financial and Social Welfare Bill 1996’ 
  Effect on  Dimension 
Reform Issue  ‗Insiders‘  ‗Outsiders‘  Redistribution  Expenditure 
Increase of contributory ceiling 
of core social welfare 
programs (PRSI) 
+  -  X   
Exemption of the first 
£80/weekly income from 
payments to core social 
security programs (PRSI) 
+  -  X   
£80 recruitment subsidy for 
employers when hiring long-
term unemployed person 
Neutral  +    X 
Implementation of community 
employment schemes  Neutral  +    X 
Compensation of long-term 
unemployed for taking low-
wage or part-time job 
-  +  X   
 
Fianna  Fàil,  the  main  party  in  opposition,  together  with  the  neo-liberal  Progressive 
Democrats  criticized  the  exclusive  focus  on  the  poor  and  people  working  in  atypical 
employment  relationships  while  ignoring  the  needs  of  middle-  and  high-income  workers. 
Michael  Dowell  from  the  Progressive  Democrats,  for  example,  criticized  that  ‘[...]  the 
government has shifted the burden of PRSI from the lower paid to the top of the structure’, 
(parliamentary minutes, 23.01.1996). Measures related to the promotion of part-time work 
(e.g. subsidies for employers) were less contested than the shifts affecting the redistributive 
dimension of the PRSI scheme. 
The  1996  Social  Welfare  and  Financial  Bill  also  included  considerable  changes  on  the 
expenditure dimension. Other than in Germany, the changes implemented by the ‗rainbow 
                                                                                                                                                      
the needs of two groups in society, those without work and those in low paid jobs’, (both quotes: parliamentary 
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coalition‘ increased public expenditure and expanded spending on social welfare issues. This 
was possible because the Irish economy was booming and tax incomes increased during the 
1990s. Even though all parties agreed that long-term unemployment was a serious problem 
of the Irish economy, many measures proposed by the ‗rainbow coalition‘ were opposed by 
the conservative parties. Critical voices regarding the help for long-term unemployed were 
also raised by some exponents of Labour, which was part of the coalition government. They 
were concerned that the subsidies for employers who hire long-term unemployed people 
would harm employees with regular working relationships. Roising Shortall (Labour Party) 
basically echoed the objections of the peak labor union (ICTU) by saying  ‘we need to be 
extremely careful to ensure that proper guidelines are in place to safeguard against its [the 
implementation of the recruitment subsidy] resulting in the displacement of existing workers 
by long-term unemployed people – on the back of a subsidy such as this – with the potential 
of  benefiting  employers  only’,  (parliamentary  minutes,  01.02.1996).
28  The  Progressive 
Democrats  did  not  support  the  strategy  of  the  government  to  increase  labor  market 
participation  and  lower  long -term  unemployment. According  to  Mairin  Quill  ‘the  key  to 
ensuring competitiveness is a reduction in costs for industry. In particular we must seek to 
reduce the cost of employing people. That means substantial cuts in personal taxation and 
PRSI both for employees and employers’, (parliamentary minutes, 30.01.1994). Overall, the 
conservative opposition would have preferred tax reductions and a substantial reform of the 
taxation  system  over  the  measures  directed  at  the  very  poor.  They  expected  that  the 
government  takes  advantage  of  the  booming  economy,  which  would  have  allowed  to 
implementing tax cuts. 
Mediating Effects of Political Constraints 
Irish governments – together with the peak labor and employers‘ organizations – negotiated 
three-year  macro-economic  programs,  which  set  the  lines  for  broader  macro-economic 
policies and, more importantly, laid the ground for the development of the industrial wages. 
The annual Social Welfare Bill and the Financial Bill need to be in agreement with these 
broader principles defined within the program. However, the final design of the proposals and 
reforms  is  in  the  hands  of  the  respective  government.  Interest  organizations  have  only 
limited access to the actual legislative policymaking process. Thus, there is only little direct in 
influence  of  interest  groups  on  the  Financial  Bill  and  the  Social Welfare  Bills.  In  the  Bill 
presented in 1996, the strong role of the Democratic Left in the government is evident. Even 
though the Democratic Left only had one government seat (De Rossa), De Rossa and the 
Democratic Left was – according to Mary Harney (leader of the Progressive Democrats) – 
‘running the show’ and considerably pulled the incumbent ‗rainbow coalition‘ towards the left 
on  the  social  policy  dimension.  John  O‘Donoghue  (Fianna  Fàil)  even  claimed  that  ‘in 
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delivering the  Budget  Statement, the  Minister for Finance, Deputy Quinn, showed all the 
sincerity of a hostage speaking at gun point. When the Minister for Social Welfare, Deputy 
De Rossa, demanded a political ransom from the Government, it decided to pay, and the 
Minister, Deputy Quinn, was sent out to read the terms of surrender. The Minister, Deputy De 
Rossa,  is  the  real  Taoiseach’,  (parliamentary  minutes,  25.01.1996).  Bertie Ahern  (Fianna 
Fàil) also complained that ‘economic policy has been hijacked by Labour and the Democratic 
Left, a party with one percent of national support’, (parliamentary minutes, 23.01.1996). 
With  little  political  and  institutional  constraints  and  a  marginalized  Fine  Gael  within  the 
‗rainbow coalition‘, the left-wing government was able to design the Social Welfare Bill in a 
way  that it addressed the needs of  those societal  groups that  were  generally  neglected, 
specifically the long-term unemployed people and other groups that are not represented by 
trade unions and other interest organizations. This focus on labor market ‗outsiders‘ was not 
appreciated by the center-right parties who accused Labour that ‘it has deserted the trade 
union  movement  again.  The  PAYE  workers,  the  trade  union  members  and  the  small 
entrepreneurs  have  been  let  down  by  this  government’,  (Bertie  Ahern,  parliamentary 
minutes,  17.04.1996).  These  political  processes  and  social  policy  outcomes  of  the  1996 
Social Welfare Bill confirm that unconstrained left-wing party governments are willing and 
able  to  implement  policies  that  are  beneficiary  to  societal  groups  who  are  generally 
underrepresented in political systems and often left behind. After many years of center and 
center-right governments, the parliamentary discourses and media coverage also documents 
how  unusual  the  government‘s  emphasis  in  social  policymaking  on  the  poorly  organized 
‗outsiders‘ in Ireland was. It was possible only because the left-wing government did not 
have to find a compromise with the center parties. 
Financial and Social Welfare Act 2001 
In 2001, Fianna Fàil was governing together with the Progressive Democrats. Nominally, the 
Progressive Democrats were fairly weak, but just as for the Democratic Left in the previous 
government, their influence on the policy agenda was strong. Mary Harney, the party leader, 
was appointed as deputy prime-minister (Tanaìste) and in charge of the important Ministry of 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment. Despite the strong rhetoric used by Dermot Ahern, the 
Minister for Social, Community and Family Affairs, the shifts in the Irish social welfare system 
were less pronounced and comprehensive than in the previous Bills implemented by the left-
wing government. In 2001, he opened the second reading of the Bill by claiming that  ‘we 
have turned around our social welfare system from one that simply compensates people for 
economic failure to one that helps people to help themselves’ (Dermot Ahern, Fianna Fàil, 
parliamentary minutes, 21.02.2001). 
As  the  overview  in  table  5  indicates,  and  as  we  would  expect  based  on  the  theoretical 
framework presented in the previous section, the focus of the Social Welfare Bills presented 
by  the  Fianna  Fàil-Progressive  Democrats  government  perfectly  mirrors  the  different I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 25 
approach of the governments towards social policies. The Budget and Social Welfare Bill by 
this liberal-conservative coalition did not include specific measures targeting at unemployed 
people, and the government did not implement any encompassing new programs or policies. 
This was not  only the case during the incumbency  of the conservative government after 
1997, but also during the period preceding the leftist ‗rainbow coalition‘ when unemployment 
was still high and the Irish economy was not performing well. The main focus of the Fianna 
Fàil/Progressive Democrats government was a reform of the Irish tax system and to reduce 
income  taxes.  Mary  Harney  (Progressive  Democrats)  characterized  the  government‘s 
program as following: ‘this government is committed to cutting tax rates [...], if low tax works 
for corporations, it works for the workers who work in those corporations’, (parliamentary 
minutes, 07.12.2001). 
Table 5: Reform Issues and Direction of Changes for ‘Financial and Social Welfare Bill 2001’ 
  Effect on  Dimension 
Reform Issue  ‗Insiders‘  ‗Outsiders‘  Redistribution  Expenditure 
Tax cuts for higher income 
brackets  +  -  X   
Increase of PRSI ceiling  +/-  Neutral  X   
Reduction of contribution rate 
(for regular employees)  +  Neutral  X   
Minimal increase of social 
welfare benefits (adjustment to 
annual inflation) 
+  -  X  X 
Abolition of PRSI contributory 
ceiling for employers  Neutral  Neutral    X 
Reduction of social insurance 
contributions for self-employed  Neutral  Neutral    X 
 
In general, the  two bills reinforced the orthodox and neo-liberal  economic policies of the 
Fianna Fàil/Progressive Democrats Government and – according to Joe Higgings (Socialist 
Party) – will ‘result in an increasing polarization between the super rich and the very highly 
paid on the one hand, and the poor and low middle income earners, on the other hand’, 
(parliamentary  minutes,  28.02.2001).  The  set  of  policies  that  can  be  attributed  to  the 
redistributive dimension is dominated by changes affecting the taxation of income, with an 
emphasis on tax cuts privileging people in higher income brackets and business owners. 
Though tax cuts for business and companies were considerable, IBEC (Irish Business and 
Employers Confederation) opposed the abolishment of the PRSI contributory ceiling, mainly 
they  feared  a  loss  of  overall  economic  competitiveness  (‗The  Irish  Times‘,  December  7, 
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The changes that altered the redistributive characteristic of genuine social policies (such as 
the  contributory  and  benefit  schemes)  were  bound  to  the  standard  increase  in  the 
employees‘  PRSI  ceiling  and  a  very  limited  decrease  of  the  PRSI  contributory  rate  for 
employees.  Policy  changes  affecting  the  expenditure  dimension  included  moderate 
increases  of  social  insurance  benefits  and  social  welfare  assistance.  However,  in  most 
categories these increases were just enough to cover for the generally increasing costs of 
living and the persistently  high inflation. Positive effects for labor market ‗outsiders‘ were 
marginal. The  raise  in  benefits  offered  by  the  government  hardly  covered  the  increasing 
costs of living, a fact that has been widely criticized by the labor unions and even more so by 
the  INOU  (Irish  National  Organization  of  the  Unemployed)  and  CORI  (Conference  of 
Religious  Ireland).  They  made  clear  that  the  benefits  offered  to  their  clientele  (mainly 
‗insiders‘) in this package were close to the minimum that they would accept. However, in a 
setting where institutional constraints are low, governments do not need to accommodate the 
‗insiders‘  and  conservative  government  put  little  emphasis  on  improving  the  situation  of 
‗outsiders‘. 
Mediating Effects of Political Constraints 
Despite the relatively good economic conditions, labor unions became more critical towards 
the  tripartite  partnership  agreements. After  years  of  wage  restraints  in  some  (mostly  the 
manufacturing) sector, the labor unions expected that their constituencies were rewarded 
and  finally  received  more  generous  benefits  in  the  wake  of  the  economic  boom.  The 
government  saved  the  partnership  agreement  by  accommodating  the  unionized  ‗insiders‘ 
and employers with a pay review and generous tax cuts. Labor market ‗outsiders‘ were put 
off with a minimal increase in welfare benefits. This confirms the theoretical assumptions as 
the economic situation would have allowed for a more egalitarian reform, but the center-right 
government was not much interested in such a more balanced reform. 
Even though the formal institutional setting did not change between 1996 and 2001, the de 
facto political constraints that the two governments faced have slightly changed. In particular, 
the government by Fianna Fàil and Progressive Democrats had to accommodate organized 
interests  to  save  the  social  partnership  agreement  as  ICTU  and  other  volunteer 
organizations implicitly threatened to leave the ‗Programme for Prosperity and Fairness‘. The 
threat  was  credible  because  the  power  balance  between  the  actors  negotiating  the 
partnership  programme  has  shifted.  Whereas  in  the  beginning,  when  the  government 
initiated the partnership programmes, the three participating groups had similar interests and 
depended on each other, the power balance had shifted towards organized labor in 2001. 
Due to near full employment and even a possible shortage of labor supply, the unions had 
greater  bargaining  power  than  in  1996  when  unemployment  still  was  high.  This  political 
constellation was mainly in favor of ‗insiders‘ and at the disadvantage of societal groups that 
– unlike peak-labor unions and employer organizations – were not as important for future 
tripartite agreements. I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 27 
Despite these shifts in the relative political power of the incumbent and the positive economic 
performance,  the  2001  reform  documents  how  the  focus  of  a  liberal  conservative 
government regarding social policy reforms and the economy differ from a social democratic 
government.  The  needs  of  labor  market  ‗outsiders‘  and  people  in  atypical  employment 
relations were not addressed by the government despite the fact that income inequality and 
the  low  wage  sector  in  Ireland  (which  mostly  hired  unskilled  people)  was  significantly 
increasing during this period. The pattern of the redistributive generosity of the core welfare 
state programs thus did not change considerably and it mainly helped the well-organized 
insiders for reasons discussed in the previous paragraphs. Moreover, the Social Welfare and 
Financial Bill 2001 led to considerably lower social spending, which continuously fell under 
the conservative incumbency, from 11.5 percent of GDP when the government took office to 
around 7 percent in 2001 (see parliamentary minutes, 07.12.2001). 28 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
 
Conclusion 
This study has examined the mediating impact of party governments and political constraints 
on social policy reforms. In particular, I assess labor market policymaking in two countries 
with varying levels of institutional constraints, Ireland and Germany, under each, a left-wing 
and  a  conservative  party  government.  Whereas  in  Germany,  the  social  democratic 
government had to accommodate the opposition in the upper chamber of parliament and 
compensate organized interests (mainly labor unions), the conservative government ‗only‘ 
had to consider the social democratic majority in the second chamber of parliament. Both 
governments, however, were unable to design encompassing labor market reforms and both 
governments in the end privileged labor market ‗insiders‘ over ‗labor market‘ outsiders de- 
spite the stated aim to re-integrate long-term unemployed and increase overall labor market 
participation. 
In  Ireland,  the  ‗rainbow  coalition‘  government  managed  to  implement  a  reform  that 
predominantly  focused  on  labor  market  ‗outsiders‘  and  aimed  at  improving  their  social 
situation. Because of a low level of political constraints, the social welfare minister from the 
Democratic Left was able to implement encompassing social policy reforms that led to an 
increase  in  overall  redistributive  generosity  and  especially  targeted  the  long-term 
unemployed people in society. In contrast, conservative government in Ireland in 2001 faced 
a fairly good economic climate and was not under pressure to cut expenditure. However, 
over all welfare state efforts decreased and wage inequality significantly increased. People 
employed in the low-wage sector were only partly covered by the insurance-based social 
security schemes and the coalition between Fianna Fàil and the Progressive Democrats did 
not significantly improve their situation. The government focused on implementing large tax 
cuts for business and people in high-income brackets. The results of the analysis largely 
confirm the expectations, derived from the theoretical framework and add to the work by 
Rueda (2005; 2007). The result also contradicts the popular wisdom that left-wing parties 
pursue policies that aim at helping the most disadvantaged in society. The joint impact of 
party governments and political constraints works in favor of the core workforce covered by 
insurance based social security schemes and at the expenses of labor market ‗outsiders‘ in 
countries  where  institutional  constraints  are  high. The  results  to  some  extent  add  to  the 
‗paradox of redistribution‘ formulated by Korpi and Palme (1998), but imply that this paradox 
is especially prominent in countries where political constraints are high, such as Germany. 
To further explore the mediating effect between party government and political constraints 
and whether the implications of this effect have changed over the recent decades, evidence 
from a wider range of countries would be helpful. Such an enterprise would benefit from 
more data on social policy decisions in parliaments. The often-used aggregate measures of 
policy change, e.g. data on social spending, are not useful in this context because they also 
reflect developments and changes that are unrelated to partisan choices and only ‗indirectly‘ I H S — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — 29 
measure social policy reforms. This study presented a detailed analysis of reform contents 
and processes in different countries with varying levels of constraints. A next step could be to 
collect a more encompassing data set that captures the reform content of such proposals 
and debates in a comparative perspective. Such data of social policy reforms/welfare state 
change would help to better explore how politics influence social policies in post-industrial 
democracies. 30 — Hübscher / The Constrained Left and its Impact on Losers of Globalization — I H S 
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